Abstract: Quantum theory does not require the existence of discontinuities: neither in time (quantum jumps), nor in space (particles), nor in spacetime (quantum events). These apparent discontinuities are readily described objectively by the continuous process of decoherence occurring locally on a very short time scale according to the Schršdinger equation for interacting systems, while the observerÕs Ôincrease of informationÕ is appropriately represented by the resulting dynamical decoupling of the corresponding components of the global wave function.
As far as is known, all properties of closed quantum systems are perfectly described by means of wave functions in configuration space (in general, wave functionals of certain fields) dynamically evolving smoothly according to the time-dependent Schršdinger equation. However, the condition of being closed (or shielded against interactions with the environment) can easily be estimated to be quite exceptional. It characterizes very special (usually atomic) systems from which the laws of quantum mechanics were derived. When the shielding ceases, most notably during measurements, discontinuous events (Ôquantum jumpsÕ or a Ôcollapse of the wave functionÕ) seem to occur, and particle aspects seem to be observed. Such events are also known to lead to a loss of interference between different values of the ÔmeasuredÕ variables -regardless of whether any result is read from the apparatus by an observer.
Macroscopic systems are very effectively coupled to their environment in this way. They cannot avoid being Ôcontinuously measuredÕ in the sense of losing interference.
1 This is obvious without any calculation, since we could never see macroscopic objects if they did not continuously scatter light which thereby had to carry away ÔinformationÕ about their position and shape. I do not know of any apparent violation of the Schršdinger equation or the superposition principle that cannot at least plausibly be expected to be derivable in terms of decoherence. In spite of this success (which can hardly be an accident), this description is often considered as insufficient to explain the measurement process itself. 4, 11 The reservations do seem sound, since decoherence is described formally by means of the density matrix of the considered subsystem of the universe, obtained by tracing out the rest (the ÔenvironmentÕ). The concept of the density matrix (of subsystems in this case) is however justified itself only as a means for calculating expectation values or probabilities for outcomes of further measurements, that is, for the secondary quantum jumps which would have to occur, for example, when the pointer is read. This explanation of measurements therefore seems to be circular from a fundamental point of view. In the global wave function (which is interpreted as representing ÔrealityÕ in this picture) all interference terms remain present. The universe as a whole never decoheres. The description of measurements by means of merely local decoherence -so goes the usual argument -must be wrong, since one does observe , in contrast to this global superposition of different outcomes derived from the Schršdinger equation, that only one of its components (a wave packet representing a definite outcome) exists after every measurement.
However, this latter claim is wrong, and so is the argument. For after an observation one need not necessarily conclude that only one component now exists but only that only one component is observed . But this fact is readily described by the Schršdinger equation without any modification. Whenever an observer interacts with the measurement device in a way that corresponds to an observation of the result, his own state must be quantumcorrelated with the macroscopic pointer position (and potentially also with other observers), and hence be decohered from the beginning. Superposed world components describing the registration of different macroscopic properties by the ÔsameÕ observer are dynamically entirely independent of one another: they describe different observers. Because of the fork-like structure of causality (the spreading in space of the retarded effects of local causes) 12 , there is no chance of their forming a superposition with respect to (or in) a local observer any more (except, perhaps, in a recollapsing Friedmann universe).
This dynamical consequence of decoherence explains everything that has to be explained dynamically in order to understand what can be observed by local observers. He who considers this conclusion of an indeterminism or spl itting of the observerÕs identity , derived from the Schršdinger equation in the form of dynamically decoupling (ÔbranchingÕ) wave packets on a fundamental global configuration space, as unacceptable or ÔextravagantÕ 13 may instead dynamically formalize the superfluous hypothesis of a disappearance of the ÔotherÕ components by whatever method he prefers, but he should be aware that he may thereby also create his own problems: Any deviation from the global Schršdinger equation must in principle lead to observable effects, and it should be recalled that none have ever been discovered. 14 The conclusion would of course have to be revised if such effects were some day to be found. But as of now, there is no objective reason to expect them to exist; and even if they did, they need not take the form of the apparent discontinuities which are readily described by means of local decoherence according to the universal Schršdinger equation.
This is not to deny the existence of several open problems. In particular, (1) only because of the continuous action of decoherence (which leads to increasing complexity, symmetry-breaking, and fine-graining into dynamically independent wave packets). This statement applies also to spacetime with its metric structure that must be part of the quasiclassical history. 20 It would be insufficient simply to require decoherence just because it leads to classically plausible consequences (such as Ôconsistent historiesÕ).
It thus appears becoming evident that our classical concepts describe mere shadows on the wall of PlatoÕs cave in which we are living. Using them for describing reality must lead to ÔparadoxesÕ.
